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Abstract- E-passport or Electronic passport is one of the newly established research areas, 
especially since in the last few years there have been numerous reported attempts of illegal 
immigration across a number of country borders. Therefore, many countries are choosing to 
introduce electronic passports for their citizens and to automate the verification process at their 
border control security. The current e-passport systems are based on two technologies: RFID 
and Biometrics. New applications of RFID technology have been introduced in various aspects of 
people’s lives. Even though this technology has existed for more than a decade, it still holds 
considerable security and privacy risks. But together with RFID and biometric technologies an           
e-passport verification system can reduce fraud, identity theft and will help governments 
worldwide to improve security at their country borders. In 2017 Sri Lankan government proposed 
to introduce a new e-passport scheme which will contain embedded RFID tags for person 
identification purpose.  
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I.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
-passports or electronic passports are a 
combination of traditional paper passports with an 
embedded Radio Frequency Identifier (RFID) tag. 
The RFID tag stores the information printed on the 
passport bio-data page along with additional biometric 
information (i.e., iris, fingerprint scans) of the holder. 
Being machine-readable, the concept of electronic 
passport improves the efficiency of the verification 
process at border control security. Concurrently the 
security of the entire passport authentication procedure 
is strengthened by e-passports with the duplication of 
bearer information printed on the bio-data page as well 
as the inclusion of biometric parameters. Many countries 
around the world have already adopted the use of 
electronic passports with the rest increasingly following 
in their footstep.
 
The security of an electronic passport system 
can be reinforced with the incorporation of a multitude of 
tactics that establish the owner’s identity as well as 
remedy some of the inherent vulnerabilities of RFID 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEWS 
Strengthening the security of e-passport 
systems has always been a sought-after research topic 
given its vitality to a fortified national defense system. 
With the adaptation of RFID as the principal technology 
in modern e-passport implementations, refining its 
security has become a leading research area given the 
hardware-based unsophisticated nature of the 
technology. Consequently, many security experts and 
academics have proposed various approaches to 
address known RFID vulnerabilities in the context of e-
passport systems as well methods to improve the 
security of passports systems overall. 
Al-Hamami & Alhafez[1]have proposed the use 
of Diffie-Hellman key exchange Algorithm to share a 
private key between the RFID tag and the NFC-
implemented Inspection System, while separately 
storing a unique watermark, inside the passport photo 
and the RFID tag. These stored watermarks will later be 
compared during the verification process to ensure that 
the Tag has not been cloned. Mehan et al. [2] 
suggested a method for authenticating electronic 
passports by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
applied in the dual domain (i.e., spatial and frequency) 
where the passport holder’s image is split into twin 
segments, and the holder’s passport particulars are 
fragmented into two parts as well. 
Wang et al. [3] proposed a two-stage 
verification method, where a person is enrolled, during 
which the image is watermarked, and authenticated 
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Abstract- E-passport or Electronic passport is one of the newly 
established research areas, especially since in the last few 
years there have been numerous reported attempts of illegal 
immigration across a number of country borders. Therefore, 
many countries are choosing to introduce electronic passports 
for their citizens and to automate the verification process at 
their border control security. The current e-passport systems 
are based on two technologies: RFID and Biometrics. New 
applications of RFID technology have been introduced in 
various aspects of people’s lives. Even though this technology 
has existed for more than a decade, it still holds considerable 
security and privacy risks. But together with RFID and 
biometric technologies an e-passport verification system can 
reduce fraud, identity theft and will help governments 
worldwide to improve security at their country borders. In 2017 
Sri Lankan government proposed to introduce a new e-
passport scheme which will contain embedded RFID tags for 
person identification purpose. Therefore, this paper proposes 
a novel multi-stage e-passport verification scheme based on 
watermarking, biometrics and RFID.
technology itself. This paper proposes a system which 
utilizes a digital watermarking mechanism to establish 
owner’s identity and to verify the integrity of the 
information stored in RFID tag. The system also 
comprised of encryption techniques to ensure the 
confidentiality of the information stored inside the RFID 
tag. The remainder of this paper will be structured as 
follows. Section 2 overviews the existing literature in the 
subject while section 3 addresses the security issues 
the proposed system attempts to solve. Section 4 
discusses the proposed solution in detail. Experimental 
results obtained from the software simulation of the 
proposed system is analyzed in the 5th section with the 
final section containing the concluding remarks.
when the watermark is extracted and verified. Their 
proposed system was based on multi-modal biometrics 
where both facial and palm samples of the user are 
extracted to produce the inputs. 
The purpose of the approach suggested by 
Saeed et al. [4]was to increase the security of existing e-
passport protocols to eliminate the data leakage and 
tag-cloning threats associated with embedded RFID 
technology. They proposed the use of increased key-
sizes to avoid data leakage, storing the private key of 
the chip in an inaccessible location to prevent tag-
cloning. In the system suggested by Peeters et al. [5], 
they propose to ensure passport-bearer privacy by 
replacing the use of bootstrap from the low entropy 
value in the e-passport MRZ with a mutual 
authentication pattern. This method involves two 
authentication stages; a terminal authentication followed 
by an e-passport authentication. Viswanathan et 
al.[6]suggested a method that embeds an invisible 
watermark inside the passenger photograph, created 
using passenger’s full name and passport number 
during the initial issuance of the passport. This method 
attempted at establishing a correspondence between 
passport's photo and its owner which could later be 
verified at border control.  
III. SECURITY OF AN E-PASSPORT 
a) Establishing a link between facial image and bio-
data 
One of the main prevalent issues in the                      
e-passport authentication process is establishing a 
correspondence between the holder’s facial photograph 
and the provided information. It is a common practice 
among illegal immigrants, blacklisted passengers, and 
other criminals to forge passport documents with their 
images and someone else’s bio-data. Accordingly, it’s 
evident that there is a requirement for a mechanism to 
bind the facial photograph of a passport holder with 
their information and be able to verify the authenticity       
of it. 
b) Facial Image & Signature Verification 
Forgery of passports using facial images 
resembling the valid owner of a passport and forging 
their signatures aren’t entirely unheard of and is a 
practice that is continued to be carried out even to this 
day. According to an official authority at Department of 
Emigrations and Immigrations of Si Lanka, individuals 
have managed to manipulate the issuance office into 
issuing passports that necessarily did not contain their 
personal information. This type of counterfeit is done by 
trying to impersonate the legitimate owner of the 
information where the impersonator either accurately 
resembled the appearance of the authentic owner            
(i.e., twin sibling, relative) or managed to manipulate the 
appearance (i.e., change hair, wear make-up) to 
resemble the original owner. Similar kinds of attempts 
are carried out to falsify the hand-signatures of passport 
holders which necessitates the requirement of a system 
that allows for the detection of such forgeries. 
c) Data Skimming 
An inherent vulnerability related to the security 
of RFID technology is the ability to read the material 
stored inside an RFID tag, by any individual in 
possession of an RFID reader, since there isn’t any 
default mechanism in place to encrypt the information 
stored within the tag. The danger of this threat lies in the 
fact that even a short distance, such as 3-foot, could 
allow an attacker to perform a skimming attack against 
an e-passport. Skimming poses one of the greatest 
threats related to e-passports since as per the mandate 
of the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), e-
passports contain sensitive passenger information such 
as passenger name, date of birth and passport 
identification number[7]. Actual deployments will include 
biometric information, nationality, profession, and place 
of birth [7]. Hence, it’s imperative to deploy a 
mechanism that ensures the confidentiality of the stored 
information within the RFID tag. 
d) Tag Cloning  
Cloning means that an adversary produces 
emulators of a genuine RFID transponder that behave 
identically and hence cannot be distinguished from the 
original transponder [8]. Although Baseline ICAO 
regulations mandate digitally signing e-passport data, 
which theoretically allows the RFID reader to validate 
that the data originated from the legitimate passport-
issuing authority, it still fails in binding the data to ane-
passport or RFID tag. Thus it provides no defense 
against potential cloning of e-passport tags [7]. This 
vulnerability requires being readily addressed to protect 
the integrity of any e-passport system. 
e) The Validity of Information Stored Inside the RFID 
Tag 
It’s extremely vital that the border security can 
verify that an e-passport contains the exact data that 
was written in the tag during the issuance process. They 
should be able to authenticate that the information 
stored by the legitimate passport issuing authority has 
not been tampered with and that they can undeniably 
verify the authenticity of information stored inside the 
embedded RFID tag ensuring guaranteed national 
security. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed solution addresses all the security 
concerns discussed under section 3, details of which are 
explained in this section. 
  
This phase takes place at Department of 
Emigration & Immigration of Sri Lanka where the 
An E-Passport System with Multi-Stage Authentication: A Case study of the Security of Sri Lanka’s 
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1) Passport Issuance
passports are issued for individuals for the first time. The 
stages involved in the passport issuance process are 
individually discussed as follows. 
a) Acquisition of Information 
During this initial stage of the system, relevant 
information about the passport applicant will be 
acquired (i.e., applicant image, signature, full name, 
gender, assigned passport number, date and place of 
birth, profession, NIC number, nationality, type of 
passport, date of issue and date of expiration). The 
acquired data will be validated for the correct data input 
format (i.e., dates in DD/MM/YYYY format etc.) and the 
existence of mandatory fields (such as first and last 
names, passport number etc.). Failure of the input 
validation process will prompt the data entry operator to 
enter the data in the correct format or to complete all 
mandatory fields. 
b) Watermarking the Facial Image 
Watermark creation requires applicant first, 
second, third and family names and passport number 
as input parameters. A random four-digit numeric key 
will be generated using which each input parameter will 
be encoded to produce a numeric value. However, 
since not all applicants possess second and third 
names, in such cases a custom value will be assigned 
for those parameters. Using these encoded parameters, 
a numeric watermark and the location to store the 
generated watermark within the image will be calculated 
and the watermark will be embedded in the calculated 
location. The watermark will be embedded replacing the 
highest intensity of RGB channels at any calculated 
location. As illustrated in figure 1 the watermarked 
image is indistinguishable from the unwatermarked 
image which preserves the undetectability of the 
watermark and perceptual similarity from the original 
image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) before    b) after  
Figure 1: Image before and after inserting watermark 
c)
 
Generate RFID Tag
 
The RFID tag
 
contain
 
all initially acquired 
information of the applicant. To prevent data skimming 
attacks the information stored in the RFID tag
 
will be 
encrypted using AES. The key for the AES encryption will 
be randomly generated to contain 14 alphanumeric and 
special characters.
 
 
d) Save Information in Corresponding Databases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:
 
Issuance Process
 
  
Passport verification is the secondary stage of 
the proposed bipartite solution. Passport verification 
process consists of the following phases.
 
a)
 
Acquisition of Required Parameters
 
During this stage, holder’s
 
passport number 
and the scanned image of passport bio-data page are 
acquired and stored at a temporary location. 
Simultaneously, the encrypted text file inside the 
embedded RFID tag is accessed, retrieved and 
temporarily stored.
 
 
 
 
Start
Get applicant 
image/signature/
details
Calculate & embed 
watermark
End
Input validation 
successful?
No
Yes
Update passenger 
information database
Update watermarking 
information database
Encrypt applicant 
information and 
write RFID file
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All information initially acquired will be saved in 
a centralized passport holder information database. 
Additionally, all required watermark calculation values 
will be stored in the centralized watermarking 
information database, which will be used during the 
validation process to verify the recalculated watermark. 
The key that was used for the AES encryption will also 
be centrally stored.
2) Passport Verification
 b) Verification of RFID-stored Information 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Facial Image Verification 
During the second stage of the verification 
process, the facial image section of the scanned bio-
data page is compared against a centrally stored facial 
image template. The images are matched using the 
feature key-points based algorithm SIFT, which would 
display the number of best-matched key-points between 
the two images. If the number of similar key-points is 
equal or greater than a predetermined threshold, set 
based on experimental results, the two images will be 
verified as similar. Otherwise, the proposed solution will 
flag the bearer-image as a mismatch. 
d) Hand-Signature Verification 
This stage follows a verification procedure akin 
to the facial image verifications procedure. The section 
of scanned bio-data page where the bearer’s signature 
is contained is extracted as an image and compared 
against the centrally stored template of the bearer 
signature that has been obtained during the issuance 
stage. The SIFT algorithm is again utilized here to detect 
identical key-points between the two images. Based on 
experimental results, a different threshold is set for 
signature verification, where the similarity of the two 
signatures is authenticated if the number of matched 
key-points is similar or greater than the determined 
threshold. 
e) Recalculate and Verify Watermark 
This is the final stage of the verification 
mechanism. The central database is accessed, and the 
bearer’s full name and the key used for the initial 
watermark calculation is extracted. The watermark is 
recalculated using the retrieved information along with 
the bearer passport number in real-time. The 
recalculated watermark values (watermark plus storage 
location) are compared against the centrally stored 
values to ensure the legitimacy of the watermark thus 
establishing a correspondence between bearer 
information and their facial image. Furthermore, the 
watermark embedded inside the facial image (which is 
stored inside the RFID tag) is compared against the 
centrally stored watermark. This is done to ensure that 
the RFID tag is bound to the holder of the passport 
which confirms that the tag has not been cloned. 
 
 
 Figure 3:
 
Passport Authentication Process
 V.
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
 The prototype was developed using Python 
programming language version 2.7. As the inputs for the 
developed verification prototype,
 
passport holder’s 
passport number and the scanned bio-data page of the 
passport are acquired which proceeds
 
the following 
multi-stage verification procedure.
 a)
 
Verify RFID Tag against the Central Server
 As shown in figure 4, during this stage the 
information inside the RFID tag will be displayed against 
the centrally stored bio-data which is accessed using 
the passport number of the bearer. Under ideal 
circumstances, the information centrally stored must be 
identical to the information extracted from the RFID tag.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Start
Acquire passport number
Passenger 
information DB
End
Scan passport information 
page
Display stored passenger 
information and RFID tag 
information
Watermarking 
information DB
Facial image similarity 
results displayed
Watermark recalculated 
and verified
Yes
Input validation 
successful?
No
Signature similarity result 
displayed
 
An E-Passport System with Multi-Stage Authentication: A Case study of the Security of Sri Lanka’s 
E-Passport
  
  
   
18
Y
e
a
r
20
18
  
 
(
)
G
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
III
 I
ss
ue
 I
I 
V
er
sio
n 
I 
© 2018   Global Journals 
As the first step of the verification process, 
using the passport number, the centralized passport 
holder information database is accessed, and the 
respective database record for passport holder is 
displayed. Simultaneously, the password for AES 
decryption of the RFID file is retrieved. The encrypted
RFID file is then decrypted, and the information is 
displayed alongside the retrieved database information. 
Human intervention is required to verify the details and 
in this case the border-control official can decide 
whether or not the information presented in the passport
and the information retrieved are similar.
Figure 4: Verifying the RFID tag against central database 
b) Facial Verification 
During this stage, the facial image contained in 
the scanned bio-data page is compared against the 
centrally stored image template of the passport bearer. 
As shown in figure 5 if the two images share a 
satisfactory number of identical key-points the porotype 
would declare them as authenticated. 
 
 
Figure 5: Facial Image Verification 
But as depicted in figure 6 if the two images do 
not contain a substantial number of similar key-points, 
i.e., the number of matching key-points are less than the 
desired threshold, the prototype will display an ‘Image 
Mismatch’ warning to the user. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Facial Image Mismatch 
c) Signature Verification 
Correspondingly, during signature verification, 
the system will successfully authenticate if the two 
signatures, the scanned signature, and the centrally-
stored signature template, share the necessary number 
of similar key-points in between. But, if the system fails 
to detect the required number of similar key-points 
between the two images, then the system will warn the 
user that the signatures are a mismatch. The results are 
displayed in figures 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
 
Figure 7: Signature Verification 
 
Figure 8: Signature Mismatch
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d) Watermark Verification 
During this final stage of verification, the 
watermark for the respective passport will be 
recalculated and compared against the centrally stored 
watermark and the watermark embedded inside the 
image stored in the RFID tag. If all three comparisons 
are identical, the system will conclude the verification 
process. 
 
 Figure 9: Watermark Verification & Authentication 
Completion
 
Table 1: Test Result Summarization
 
Passport
 
RFID 
Information 
Verification
 
Facial 
Image 
Verification
 
Signature 
Verification 
Watermark 
Verification 
1
 

 

 

 

 2
 

 

 

 

 3
 

 

 

 

 4
 

 

 

 

 5
 

 

 

 

 6
 

 

 

 

 7
 

 

 

 

 8
 

 

 

 

 
VI.
 
CONCLUSION
 
In this paper we propose a novel multi-stage 
authentication scheme that incorporates verification of 
data stored inside the RFID tag, watermarking, facial and 
signature authentication for e-passports. Information 
embedded within the RFID tag is first compared against 
the centrally stored bio-data to determine their similarity. 
The printed facial image and signature on the passport 
are compared against centrally stored items to validate 
their authenticity. As the final stage of the verification, the 
watermark embedded in the image stored inside the 
RFID tag will be recalculated and compared to establish 
owner identity as well prevent tag-cloning. All the 
information stored inside the RFID tag is encrypted to 
eliminate skimming attacks. The experimental results 
reflect the functionality of the proposed solution at each 
stage. 
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